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Abstract 
In our paper, we focus on the relation of decision-making and cognitive structuring of students at university. In the 
introduction, we concern on various theories of decision-making, especially we concern on the theory of rational 
decision-making and the psychological theory of decision-making. In the centre of our attention is the theory of Janis 
and Mann, which is the resource of the research. Very important part of our paper is a section about cognitive 
structuring which consists of two elementary factors – the need for structure and the ability to achieve cognitive 
structure. Both processes, decision-making and cognitive structuring are based on information processing. We want 
to explore relations among the cognitive structuring components and the components of decision-making – self-
esteem of decision maker, vigilance, shifting responsibility, procrastination, hypervigilance. The research question 
was if the ability to work with information is a condition of effective decision-making. In the end of the paper, we 
present conclusions connected with educational environment. 
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1. Theories of decision-making 
Decision-making process is a term which means a process of choosing one alternative out of more. 
Montgomery (1983 in Fábry et al., 1992) describes this term as a process of looking for some dominant 
structure, while one alternative is better than the other ones, at least in one attribute; moreover all its 
disadvantages are eliminated in different ways. From behavioristic point of view, decision-making 
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process is defined as a process which happens in situations where it is possible to choose out of different 
stimuli and responses. (Edwards, Tversky in Fábry et al., 1992).  
Decision-making process is a process which has its part in an everyday life and in a psychological 
research too. This process relates to the issue of cognitive styles, categorization (Sarmány-Schuller, 1998) 
and risk (Sarmány-Schuller, 1979, Sarmány-Schuller, Pavličková, 2005, Fandelová, 1996), coping
strategies in Slovakia (Ruisel, Ruiselová, Prokopčáková, 1994). Big attention has been devoted to the 
procrastination in recent decades (Sarmány-Schuller, 2000; 1999), then to decision-making styles 
(Sarmány-Schuller, Pilárik, 2005; Pilárik, 2006), faulty decision making (Sarmány-Schuller, Skovayová, 
1992) and personality dimensions (Sarmány -Schuller, 2000, Ficková, 1994) associated with decision-
making process. Former research data are focused on the operators' decision-making and moral 
assumptions of optimal decision (Daniel, 1971; Daniel, Droppová, 1979; Zelman, 1979).
There are two dominant fundamental lines in the theory of decision-making – the theory of rational 
decision-making and the theory of psychological decision-making.  
The theory of rational decision-making puts forward two basic questions: “How to decide in a rational 
way?” and “How to choose the optimal alternative?”. This theory is based on studies of Lange and 
Sadowski. It is based on fundamental arguments that are firmly anchored in rational postulates. They are 
based on the definition of a rational man who is able to analyze a situation in which he is, in accordance 
with the principles of logic. He takes into account all possible alternatives during decision-making 
process and can choose the best alternative. (according to Kozielecki, 1977; 1981) 
The earliest models of how people decide are called a classical decision-making theory. A classical
decision-making theory has advantages of an economic perspective in terms of creating and using of 
mathematical models for human behavior and is associated with terms an economic man and an economic 
woman. This model assumes a full awareness of possible alternatives and their consequences, sensitivity
to slight differences between alternatives and rationality manifested of maximizing the value (according 
to Sternberg, 2002). We distinguish the following decision-making approaches within the classical 
decision-making models – approaches by Bayes, Fox, Newell and Simon (Fábry et al., 1992).
Solving of the problem of (un)bounded rationality of a decision maker is in psychology of decision-
making dated back to the period of the fifties in the last century and is connected with the name Simon. 
Simon (1957) states that a person is not in a decision-making process necessarily an irrational one, but 
he/she reflects in the bounded rationality. Simon (1957) defined a decision-making process as
satisfaction, in which we do not concern all alternatives through comparing it, because they maximize our 
profits and minimize losses. However, we consider the minimum possible number of alternatives in such 
a way to reach decision which we believe is satisfying for us. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992 in Sarmány-
Schuller, 2000) follow these ideas and add that current decision-making situations in various areas are 
characterized by the number of used criteria, type and use of search information, sources of information,
using heuristics, as well as the number of alternatives generated by the heuristics.
Tversky (1972a, 1972b) developed Simon's idea of bounded rationality in the seventies of the 
twentieth century. He focused on situations in which a large number of alternatives are available for the 
decision maker and he is not able to consider them all. Tversky (1972a, 1972b) believes that the decision
maker will use a method of elimination in this case. He focuses on one aspect occurring at different 
options and at the same time he creates the minimum criterion for it. He excludes all options which do not
meet the criterion. He selects other aspect at the remaining options and he sets a minimum criterion to it 
and he will continue in elimination. This process finishes when there is only one alternative left.
The theory of rational decision-making is a normative theory, which takes into account rationality,
which might be also called an instrumental theory. The principle of the instrumental rationality is the best 
achievement of the objectives and not the optimal goal itself. According to this theory the role of a
decision maker is to choose methods to maximize the target regardless of the impact of its action on other
individuals or institutions. Therefore Kozielecki (1977) suggests, along with the instrumental rationality, 
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to take into account an axiological rationality which function is a focus on constructiveness of set targets 
considering a social environment.
Psychological decision-making theory was developed due to economical and statistical studies.  The 
representatives of this theory are trying to answer the question of a descriptive character: “How do people 
decide?” Therefore they divert from the normative framework of the theory of rational decision-making
which aims at optimizing of the process and results of decision.
The subject of the psychological theory of decision-making is an activity of a decision maker in a
decision-making process, but also the structure of roles and personality characteristics of people (eg.: 
characteristics of the memory or the ability to transform information) in the decision-making process.
Tasks placed on a decision maker are diverse, but their common feature is a set of alternatives from which
a person selects only one. Each alternative, or a variant of solutions, belongs to a set of possible 
outcomes, consequences in decision-making process (Kozielecki, 1977).
There are applied so mechanisms in a decision-making process, such as achieving pleasure and 
avoiding pain. With these theories operate also SEU theories (subjective expected utility) (eg.: Hurwicz,
1953 in Křivohlavý, 1966, Savage, 1954 in Kozielecki, 1977, Edwards 1992, Sheffrin, 1983 in Sarmány-
Schuller, 2000), on the base of which a decision maker tries to maximize a positive benefit (pleasure) and
to minimize a negative benefit (pain). The SEU theories therefore work with the concept of a subjective
utility. They characterize a decision-making process by a subjective probability. If we know these
variables, we should know to predict the optimal decision according to the SEU theory. Therefore, the 
SEU theories ate based on assumption of and unbounded rationality, the same way as a traditional theory 
of decision-making. However, people in decision-making process do not always seem fully rational.
Traditional examples of utility theories always involve a time factor in itself. Experiments of decision-
making realised at children and adults show that subjective utility is lower if the consumption time comes
later, or if more time passes till utility time. This phenomenon is known as „gratification delay“, it means 
an ability to resist a momentary pressure and withstand as long as the conditions are more favourable for 
a decision maker. According to results of such experiments we can assume that there exists a certain 
hierarchy of values in every person. It means there are also certain scales of subjective utility, which
individuals bring to their decisions (Sarmány-Schuller, 2000).
Almost each decision is connected with a risk. The best-known theories that highlight aspects of risk in 
decision-making theories are those ones by Busemeyer and Townsend, Feather, Janis and Mann.
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) developed a decision field theory (DFT), which illustrates a 
decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. DFT incorporated four interlinked factors – probabilistic
search, steps and range, approach avoidance balance and time constraints. Elaboration of these criteria
represents a shift in the implication of contextual and individual characteristics within the decision-
making process. 
Feather (1985 in Sarmány-Schuller, 2000) emphasizes the need of the application of dynamic aspects 
in decision-making process. He developed a model of a dynamic decision-making process concerning on 
the temporal sequence of decisions which may change the specification of tasks in time. There is changed
information that acquires a different quality than in the first step of decision. Finally, implications of 
decision-making change; they are aimed to future.
Janis and Mann (1977 in Sarmány-Schuller, 2000) focused on the role of conflict in decision-making 
process. The theory of conflict analyzes the coping patterns used by individuals if he/she faces difficult 
life or working decisions. The core of the theory is in stress that enters the decision conflict as a major 
determinant of failure while achieving high quality decisions. The conflict model identifies five main 
coping patterns within the inducing stress which eventuates from different decisions of a decision maker.
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2. Cognitive structuring 
Cognitive structuring defines Neuberg and Newson (1993 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997) as
the creation and use of abstract mental representations, which are simplified by generalizations of 
previous experience.
The importance of cognitive structuring plays an important role in memory processes and the 
perception of people (Alba, Hasher, 1983; Allport, 1954; Anderson, 1983; Cantor, Mischel, 1979 in Bar-
Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak,1997), stereotypes (Kruglanski, Freund, 1983; Stephan, 1989; Taylor, 1981 in 
Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997), cognitive processes (Kruglanski, Ajzen, 1983 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-
Rabin, Tabak, 1997), stress and its coping (Epstein, Meier, 1989; Wheaton in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, 
Tabak, 1997), attitudes (Jamieson, Zanna, 1989; Schlegel, DiTecco, 1982 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, 
Tabak, 1997), but especially when experiencing uncertainty and its removal (Bar-Tal, 1993, 1994; 
Bunder, 1962; Mayseles, Kruglanski, 1987 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997).
Cognitive structuring assists a person effectively acquire a sense of security. If we define the 
uncertainty (the removal of which is the fundamental of cognitive structuring) in accordance with Bunder 
(1962 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tobacco, 1997; Sarmány - Schuller 2001) as the inability to adequately 
categorize and structure information, we can find the effectiveness of cognitive structuring in its relative 
automaticity, speed and undeliberateness (Brewer, 1988; Shiffrin, Schneider, 1977; Taylor, Crocker, 1981 
in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tobacco, 1997).  
Cognitive structuring helps to develop reassurance in a sense that a person does not perceive 
inconsistent and irrelevant information.
Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak (1997) assume that cognitive structuring consists of two components –
need for structure and ability to achieve cognitive structure.  
A need for structure is defined as the preference of cognitive structuring, which is understood as (1) an 
opposite towards a piecemeal processing of information and (2) a means leading to a reassurance (Bar-
Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997). 
In the past, many authors devoted to the need for cognitive structure (for instance Bunder, Newson,
Kruglanski), who, however, used the names such as tolerance for ambiguity, dogmatism, open mind, 
focus on confidence, the need for cognition, desire for a simple structure, personal need for a structure, 
the need for cognitive closure, the preference for consistency to describe this term.
We will focus on research findings of some authors mentioned above.
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tobacco, 1997) notes that people, who do not have 
a tolerance for ambiguity, prefer the familiar and confidential information, as well as symmetry, closure, 
permanent regularity. They tend to premature conclusions, black and white vision, simplifying 
dichotomisation.
Smock (1955 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tobacco, 1997) adds Frenkel-Brunswik. Intolerance of 
ambiguity reflects the need of a person to become familiar with his/ her surroundings.
Rokeach (1960 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tobacco, 1997) defines the difference between open-
minded people and closed-minded people. Open-minded people have a system of cognitive beliefs which 
leads them towards new information. Close-minded people focus on known and predictable events.
Roney, Sorrentino (1987 in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997) point to differences between people 
oriented on certainty and people oriented on uncertainty. People oriented on certainty use clear and 
structured categories, they can see a world in black and white, and they can reach the certainty the way 
that they ignore inconsistency and ambiguity. People oriented on uncertainty dispose with richly 
developed and low differentiated categories. They cope with inconsistency in a direct way and do not 
avoid confrontation with it.
On base of above mentioned conclusions, we can generalize differences between people with high and 
low need for cognitive structure. People with high need for cognitive structure reduce the uncertainty in 
200   Michal Čerešník /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  55 ( 2012 )  196 – 205 
both non-systematic and heuristic ways and on base of created (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Pavelchak, 1986 in 
Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997). People with low need for cognitive structure reduce uncertainty in 
an individual way, in a piecemeal process which is systematic and based on meaningful search for 
relevant information which evaluates and assimilates to its system (Driscoll, Hamilton, Sorrentino, 1991 
in Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, Tabak, 1997). They tend to use piecemeal processes in information processing.
Table 1. Combination of need for cognitive structure and ability to achieve cognitive structure  
Need for cognitive structure
Low High
A
bi
lit
y 
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ni
tiv
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e L
ow
Low level of piecemeal structuring Low level of cognitive structuring
Unintended information processing Hypervigilance
Dysfunctional impulsivity Low self-efficiency
Low self-efficiency High uncertainty
High uncertainty Obsessions, compulsions
Frequent use of stereotypes High sensitivity
Low level of stress Less frequent use of stereotypes
Very high level of stress
H
ig
h
High level of piecemeal structuring The high level of cognitive structuring
Intended information processing Unintended information processing
Vigilance Functional impulsivity
High self-efficiency High self-efficiency
Low certainty High certainty
High level of stress High level of repression
Frequent use of stereotypes
Low level of stress
The ability to achieve cognitive structure relates to how the one is able to utilize the process of 
information processing, which is consistent with its need for cognitive structure. In the case of a high 
need for structure, it regards to (1) avoidance of information that the one cannot categorized in
accordance with existing knowledge and (2) organizing of knowledge the way to be adapted to existing 
cognitive structure. In the case of a low need for structure, it regards to (3) active and systematic 
understanding of all available information. In general, the ability to achieve cognitive structure can be 
defined as the ability to use its categories the same way as analytical information processing in
accordance with the tasks that are the man asked. 
Need for cognitive structure and ability to achieve cognitive structure are components of cognitive 
structuring process, which combination we can get four types related to processing of information: 
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x Low need for structure - low ability to achieve cognitive structure (in research is used abbreviation 
LPNS – LAACS), 
x Low need for structure – high ability to achieve cognitive structure (LPNS – HAACS), 
x High need for structure – low ability to achieve cognitive structure (HPNS – LAACS), 
x High need for structure – high ability to achieve cognitive structure (HPNS – HAACS). 
Particular characteristics of mentioned types are displayed in Table 1. 
3. Research 
The sample consisted of 75 participants whose average age was 21. They were students of Faculty of 
Social Sciences and Health Care, Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. Their fields of study
were social work and psychology. Women dominated in the research group.
We used the following questionnaires for data collecting (in alphabetical order):
AACSS – Ability to Achieve Cognitive Structure Scale  
author: Bar-Tal  
The questionnaire consists of twenty-four claims that a participant assesses in the 6-point scale. Items of 
the questionnaire include the following four fields: easy use of cognitive structure, difficulties with use of 
cognitive structure, easy use of a piecemeal information processing, and difficulties with use of a 
piecemeal information processing.  The output is a single number that characterizes the individual ability 
to achieve cognitive structure. 
MDMQ – Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire 
author: Mann et al. 
Twenty-two-item questionnaire designed to identify a decision-making style. It has 5 factors in its 
extended version: 
SED (evaluation of self-esteem as a decision maker in terms of ability of effective decision-making 
skills),
VIG (vigilance),
SR (shifting responsibility);
PRO (procrastination),
HYP (hypervigilance) 
PNSS - Personal Need for Structure Scale 
authors: Thopson, Naccarato, Parker 
The questionnaire consists of 12 claims which are reviewed by a 6-point scale. Questionnaire items are 
designed to capture the organization and method of processing information, as well as stereotyped 
responses, external keys when creating judgments, processing of inconsistent information, efforts to 
enrich existing knowledge.
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We hypothesis that: 
H1 high ability to achieve cognitive structure is in relation with high self-esteem in decision-
making. 
H2 high ability to achieve cognitive structure is in relation with vigilance. 
H3 low ability to achieve cognitive structure is in relation with shifting responsibility. 
H4 low ability to achieve cognitive structure is in relation with procrastination. 
H5 low ability to achieve cognitive structure is in relation with hypervigilance. 
To test our hypothesis we used Statistical Program for Social Science 17.0. We used Kruskal-Wallis 
test to test differences among research groups. As a critical statistical value which indicates the statistical 
significance, we appointed the standard value of p = 0,05. 
The results are presented in tables 2 to 6. All differences are significant at the level of α ≤ 0.001. The 
only exception is the vigilance in which we did not measured the significant difference among research
groups. At this place we explain the abbreviations we used in tables. CS = cognitive structuring, AACS = 
ability to achieve cognitive structure, PNS = personal need for structure, H = high, L = low, N = count, 
Min = minimal measured value, Max = maximal measured value,  Me = median, AM = average mean, 
SD = standard deviation, H = result of  Kruskal-Wallis test, p = significance.
We allege that we can support all hypothesizes we designated except the hypothesis 2. 
4. Conclusions and discussion 
We found that the students with high ability to structure the information have also high self-esteem in 
decision-making. They do not have the tendency to use ineffective decisional styles in forms as shifting 
responsibility, procrastination and hypervigilance. On the other hand, we did not find the relation between 
high ability to structure information and vigilance as effective decisional style. 
We can write that the crucial factor which determined decisional style was the ability to achieve 
cognitive structure. Personal need for structure was the factor which emphasizes the effect of the ability to 
achieve cognitive structure in case of shifting responsibility and procrastination. 
So we cannot support the relation between high ability to process the information and effective 
deciding. But we can support the relation low ability to process the information and ineffective deciding. 
And what are the implications to educational environment? In the present reform of educational 
system, there is the accent on the humanistic approach. It means the change of the relation educator –
educant, curricular transformation and also the aspiration to emphasize non-intellectual factors of 
education. But the ability to process the information stays the base on which we have to build the 
education of the students. Information is not only concepts, theories, facts, but also the emotions, 
attitudes, beliefs, patterns of behavior. Maybe this is the reason why we think about putting back the math 
into the final exam in secondary school as an inherent part. 
The limits of our research are evident. The research sample is small. It is representative for the faculty 
on which the research was realized, but it is not representative for whole population of students. But the 
results are clear. 
There exists a tendency to decide ineffectively. It means the human has a tendency to deciding delay,  
to not accept own responsibility for own decisions or has neurotic symptoms because he has the problem 
to select important information and avoid the unimportant ones. It leads to disbelief to own competences, 
negative emotions and low self-esteem which was strong influence on own self-image. 
If we do not want to learn the students who do not know to decide we have to support their ability to 
process the information as a part of cognitive effectivity and metacognitive factor.  
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Table 2. Differences in self-esteem among the groups of cognitive structuring 
groups of CS N Min Max Me AM SD H p
self-esteem
LAACS-LPNS 21 4 10 8 7.57 1.66
21.987 <0.001HAACS-LPNS 21 5 12 10 9.29 1.88
HAACS-HPNS 16 6 12 11 10.06 1.56
LAACS-HPNS 17 5 12 8 7.47 2.10
Table 3. Differences in vigilance among the groups of cognitive structuring 
groups of CS N Min Max Me AM SD H p
vigilance
LAACS-LPNS 21 5 12 10 9.38 2.11
5.319 0.150HAACS-LPNS 21 6 12 10 9.57 2.14
HAACS-HPNS 16 7 12 11 10.81 1.52
LAACS-HPNS 17 7 12 10 9.94 1.95
Table 4. Differences in shifting responsibility among the groups of cognitive structuring 
groups of CS N Min Max Me AM SD H p
shifting 
responsibility
LAACS-LPNS 21 1 12 6 5.76 2.81
21.112 <0.001HAACS-LPNS 21 1 8 5 4.57 1.83
HAACS-HPNS 16 0 6 2 2.50 2.13
LAACS-HPNS 17 0 12 7 6.76 2.93
Table 5. Differences in procrastination among the groups of cognitive structuring 
groups of CS N Min Max Me AM SD H p
procrastination
LAACS-LPNS 21 1 8 5 4.95 1.96
28.417 <0.001HAACS-LPNS 21 1 6 2 2.81 1.78
HAACS-HPNS 16 0 4 2 1.75 1.29
LAACS-HPNS 17 2 9 5 4.94 1.98
Table 6. Differences in hypervigilance among the groups of cognitive structuring 
groups of CS N Min Max Me AM SD H p
hypervigilance
LAACS-LPNS 21 0 10 5 5.19 2.34
22.043 <0.001HAACS-LPNS 21 1 7 4 3.67 1.83
HAACS-HPNS 16 1 5 4 3.31 1.30
LAACS-HPNS 17 3 9 6 6.12 1.62
204   Michal Čerešník /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  55 ( 2012 )  196 – 205 
References 
Bar-Tal, Y., Kishon-Rabin, L., & Tabak, N. (1997). The effect of need and ability to achieve cognitive 
structuring on cognitive structuring. Journal of personality and social psychology, 6, 1158 – 1176.
Busermeyer, J.R., & Townsend, J T. (1993). Decision field theory: A dynamic- cognitive approach to 
decision making under uncertain environment. Psychological Review, 100, 432 – 459.
Fábry, R., Markuš, A., Ficková, E., & Dvořáková, T. (1992). Rozhodovanie operátora – riešenie 
problému –mentálny model. Československá psychologie, 4, 309-324, 1992. 
Ficková, E. (1994). Relationships between activation, anxiety and stress in decision making of operators. 
Studia psychologica, 2, 113-122. 
Daniel, J. a kol. (1971). Analýza práce operátora v automatizovanej výrobe. Záverečná správa ÚEP SAV.
Daniel, J., & Droppová, Z. (1979). Niektoré východiská výskumu rozhodovania a záťaže operátora. 
Psychologie v ekonomické praxi, 3-4, 239-244.
Kozielecki J. (1977). Psychologiczna teoria decyzji. Varšava: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo naukove. 
Kozielecki J. (1981). Psychological decision theory. Varšava: Polish Scientific Publishers. 
Křivohlavý, J. (1966). Rozhodování. Československá psychologie, 1, 3-17.
Pilárik, Ľ. (2006). Osobnostné faktory maladaptívnych štýlov rozhodovania. Medzinárodná konferencia 
doktorandov odborov Psychológia a Sociálna práca. Nitra: UKF. 
Pilárik, Ľ., & Sarmány-Schuller, I. (2005). Optimálna hladina stimulácie a jej motivačné atribúty. Svět žen 
a svět mužů: polarita a vzájemné obohacování. Olomouc: UP v Olomouci.
Ruisel, I., Ruiselová, Z., & Prokopčáková, A. (1994). Subjective aspects of problem solving and decision 
making in the context of coping. Studia psychologica, 2, 77-90.
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (1979). Rizikové tendencie v kontexte osobnostných dimenzií. Psychologie v 
ekonomické praxi, 1. 
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (1993). Different problem solving strategies (What role is played by optimism-
pessimism here?). Studia psychologica, 4, 377-379.  
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (1996). Podiel osobnostnej črty anxiety a impluzivity na štýl učenia. Retrospektíva, 
realita a perspektíva psychológie na Slovensku. Bratislava: Stimul, 403-407.
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (1998). Category width, cognitive style and decision making processes. Studia 
psychologica, 3, 250-254.  
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (1999). Procrastination, need for cognition and sensation seeking. Studia 
psychologica, 1, 73-85.  
205 Michal Čerešník /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  55 ( 2012 )  196 – 205 
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (2000). Prokrastinácia - osobnostné koreláty. Psychologie pri třetí tisíciletí. Praha: 
Testcentrum, 322-324.  
Sarmány-Schuller, I. (2001). Potreba štruktúry a schopnosť vytvárať štruktúry ako osobnostné konštrukty. 
Psychológia pre bezpečný svet. Bratislava: Stimul, 336-339.  
Sarmány-Schuller, I., & Skovayová, Ľ. (1992). Erroneous decision making in the operators work. Studia 
psychologica, 1, 77-84. 
Sarmány-Schuller, I., & Pavličková, K. (2005). Rizikové rozhodovanie v kontexte osobnosti. Psychológia 
pre život - alebo ako je potrebná metanoia. Bratislava: Stimul, 476-482. 
Sarmány-Schuller, I., & Pilárik, Ľ.  (2005). Štýly rozhodovania z pohľadu osobnostných dimenzií J.Graya. 
Psychológia pre život - alebo ako je potrebná metanoia. Bratislava: Stimul, 186-190. 
Simon, H.A. (1957). Administrative behavior. New Jersey: Littlefield Adams. 
Sternberg, R.J. (2002). Kognitivní psychologie. Praha: Portál.
Tversky, A. (1972a). Choice by elimination. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 9, 341-367.
Tversky, A. (1972b). Eliminations by aspects: A theory of choice. Psychological Review, 79, 281-299. 
Zelman, J. (1979). Psychologický výskum operátora v ASRTP. Psychologie v ekonomické praxi, 3-4, 
245-249.
